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TRUSTING FORMER REBELS: AN EXPERIMENTAL
APPROACH TO UNDERSTANDING REINTEGRATION AFTER
CIVIL WAR*
Michal Bauer, Nathan Fiala and Ian Levely
The stability of many post-conflict societies rests on the successful reintegration of former soldiers.
We use a set of behavioural experiments to study the effects of forced military service for a rebel
group (the Lord’s Resistance Army) on trust and trustworthiness in Northern Uganda. We present
evidence that soldiers did not self-select nor were systematically screened by rebels. We find that the
experience of soldiering increases individual trustworthiness and community engagement, especially
among those who soldiered during early age. These results suggest that the impact of child soldiering
on social behaviour is not necessarily detrimental.
In conflicts around the world, the forcible recruitment of soldiers, often children, is
a widespread practice among many militaries and insurgent groups (Blattman and
Miguel, 2010; Beber and Blattman, 2013). After conflicts end, policy makers and
researchers warn that societies risk falling into the conflict trap, in part because
former combatants may become economically worse off or socially isolated. Feelings
of frustration and low opportunity costs may increase the chances that they join
armed groups in the future (Collier et al., 2003; Collier and Hoeffler, 2004; Knight
and €Ozerdem, 2004). This makes it essential to understand the effects of combat on
former soldiers’ economic outcomes, attitudes and behaviour, especially in develop-
ing country contexts where most violent conflicts take place. Studies from the US
and the Netherlands have shown that military service and exposure to combat lowers
earnings and employment (Angrist, 1990; Angrist and Krueger, 1994; Imbens and
van der Klaauw, 1995). In Northern Uganda, Blattman and Annan (2010) document
that combat for a rebel group lowered schooling and earnings, suggesting that
economic gaps may generalise to developing countries. Thus, while progress has
been made towards understanding impacts on labour market outcomes, little is
known about the legacy of soldiering on social behaviour and on community
acceptance.1
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In this article, we explore two questions in particular:
(i) How does the experience of being abducted to fight for a rebel group affect
individual trustworthiness and civic engagement? and
(ii) Do members of the receiving communities mistrust and discriminate against
former combatants?
We do so by employing behavioural experiments and surveys in Northern Uganda to
study trust and trustworthiness in economic interactions between former rebels and
people from receiving communities.
Besides having implications for post-conflict re-integration and development, under-
standing the adaptation of social behaviour among soldiers who fight during warfare is
interesting theoretically. Several streamsof literature have highlighted the importance of
adhering to social norms and trustworthiness during warfare, recognising that soldiers
are more likely to survive if they form cohesive groups and overcome collective action
problems inherent in war. Scholars studying the effectiveness of military units have
argued that trustworthiness, as well as other elements of social capital, are crucial for
military groups to work effectively (Costa and Kahn, 2001; Kenny, 2011). More broadly,
evolutionary theorists have proposed that the environment of lethal conflict between
groups, or other external threats, should favour the development of parochial altruism
(Boyd and Richerson, 2005; Choi and Bowles, 2007; Bowles, 2008), greater norm
adherence or more altruistic preferences towards individuals that people identify with.2
So far, researchers have tested the question of whether conflict can be the source of
altruism and trustworthiness among civilians who have been differentially exposed to
war. The evidence suggests that greater exposure reduces selfishness and increases pro-
social behaviour towards in-group members (Bellows and Miguel, 2009; Voors et al.,
2012; Gilligan et al., 2014; Bauer et al., 2014a, 2016). We contribute to this literature by
studying this question among former child soldiers who were forced to take an active
part in a brutal insurgent group and who thus happened to grow up, in part, in an
environment which arguably shares many features with fighting bands that charac-
terised much of our evolutionary history (Bowles, 2009).
Further, little is known about whether people in receiving communities are aware of
behavioural changes in trustworthiness among former combatants and whether
resentment represents a barrier to trusting this group. Trust and trustworthiness are
vital for mutually beneficial interactions to take place when complete contracts are not
feasible or available. This is not only true within families or among friends but also in
market settings – Kenneth Arrow (1972, p. 357) famously noted that ‘Virtually every
commercial transaction has within itself an element of trust’. In rural economies,
essentially all economic interactions are governed by informal arrangements. There-
fore, a lack of trust and trustworthiness may hamper access to jobs, credit or informal
insurance and saving schemes.3 To the best of our knowledge, ours is the first study
2 Note that these models postulate that the development of parochial altruism due to inter-group conflict
operates at the evolutionary level, i.e. due to selection. Here, we consider a within-individual behavioural
reaction of being exposed to conflict in the spirit of these models.
3 Empirically, societal trust has been found to be linked with the quality of self-governance of communities
(Cox et al., 2011; G€achter and Herrmann, 2011), financial development and trade (Guiso et al., 2004) and
the rate of economic growth (Knack and Keefer, 1997).
© 2017 Royal Economic Society.
[AUGUST 2018] T RU S T I N G FO RM E R R E B E L S 1787
that uses an experimental approach to identify potential discrimination against former
soldiers and measures trust towards this group in an incentive compatible way.
The setting we study is Northern Uganda, where the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA),
an unpopular local rebel group, forcibly and indiscriminately recruited tens of
thousands of youths during a war that lasted for 20 years. A noteworthy aspect of this
setting is that, at the point of recruitment, soldiers in Northern Uganda were not a
select group compared to their peers. This is in contrast to conscription practices in
other conflicts. In particular, we build on the previous detailed evidence of Blattman
and Annan (2010) and argue that the LRA recruitment methods created exogenous
variation in conscription which was not affected by self-selection and screening by the
armed group. Thus, comparing the behaviour of former LRA soldiers with their non-
abducted peers is, we believe, more informative about the legacies of soldiering than in
other post-conflict settings.
Five years post-conflict, we collected large-scale experimental data (N = 688) and
implemented a variant of the trust (investment) game (Berg et al., 1995). In this
sequential, two-player game, Senders are first given the option to transfer money to
Receivers. The amount sent is tripled by the experimenter, and then the Receiver
decides how much to transfer back to the Sender. Two groups of individuals took part
in the task. A random sample of middle-aged villagers from conflict-affected area, who
were too old to have been targeted for forced conscription by the LRA, made choices as
Senders. The amount which they choose to invest tells us how much they trust the
Receiver. A second group, consisting of younger males (18–34) from similar
communities as Senders, some of whom had been forcibly recruited by the LRA,
were recruited as Receivers. The amount that they returned indicates their trustwor-
thiness.
Before making their decisions, Senders received some information about Receivers.
We varied whether they were told that Receivers had been with the LRA for around one
month, for around one year, or given no information on abduction history. By
comparing the amount sent by Senders across treatments, we can measure whether
trust depends on individual LRA history of the Receiver. In order to separate whether
observed differences in received trust transfers are driven by perceived differences in
trustworthiness of former soldiers or different levels of altruism felt towards this group,
Senders were also asked about expected back transfers and to make choices in a non-
strategic Dictator game.4 Last, we compare actual back transfers of the former LRA
soldiers and their peers, in order to shed light on the effect of LRA soldiering on
trustworthiness and to assess whether villagers hold accurate beliefs about trustwor-
thiness of former soldiers.
The trust game has several features which make it a suitable tool to study behavioural
differences in this setting. First, this incentivised task is very simple to explain (Sutter
and Kocher, 2007), yet it captures the key elements of many principal–agent
interactions in labour and credit markets, since it requires both trust and
4 In terms of experimental design, we build on Fershtman and Gneezy (2001) who study ethnic
discrimination using the trust, dictator and ultimatum games among university students in Israel. Our design
differs from their study in that we elicit beliefs about partners’ behaviour and use a within subject design
instead of an across subject design.
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trustworthiness for mutually beneficial transactions to take place. Second, previous
research suggests that trust game is a powerful tool for detecting discrimination against
individuals with certain group attributes, including race (Fershtman and Gneezy, 2001)
and low socio-economic status (Falk and Zehnder, 2013). Also, the trust game and
related experimental games have been used to demonstrate the influence of
community characteristics and early life experiences on pro-social behaviour (Barr,
2003; Henrich et al., 2006; Cameron et al., 2013).5 Finally, observing behaviour and
eliciting beliefs in comparable trust and dictator games allows us to link patterns of
choices to competing economic theories of discrimination in a straightforward way
(Fershtman and Gneezy, 2001; Ashraf et al., 2006) and distinguish whether discrim-
ination, if it exists, originates in preferences (taste-based discrimination) or beliefs
(statistical discrimination) and whether beliefs about other groups are accurate. Such
distinctions are crucial for designing effective policies that target discrimination by, for
example, regulating certain behaviours or spreading information to combat stereo-
types (Gneezy et al., 2012).
Our main findings can be summarised as follows. First, we find that former soldiers
transfer a higher share back to Senders in the Trust game compared to their peers.
The effect of soldiering on trustworthiness is particularly strong among those who
soldiered during early age (were abducted below 14 years of age) and muted for
participants who were abducted during late adolescence or adulthood. The observed
increase in trustworthiness is economically important, robust to controlling for a
range of characteristics and it is not driven by differences in the economic well-being
or understanding of the task. We find a similar pattern when we replace experimental
measures of trustworthiness with out-of-laboratory proxies of pro-social behaviour,
constructed based on responses to questions on participation in local community
groups. While the observed patterns are most consistent with the impact of soldiering
on social behaviour, we also explicitly analyse whether the effect could be attributed
to selection caused by higher mortality among less trustworthy soldiers. We also note
that we are not able to nail down the precise mechanism linking soldiering and
change in trustworthiness and this remains an important question to explore for
future research.
As a second step, we investigate trust towards former soldiers. On average, we find a
positive but statistically insignificant effect of Receivers’ history with the LRA on
investments in the trust game. Interestingly, Senders who have had a son abducted by
the LRA invested significantly more in the LRA treatments. The difference in
investments seems to be statistical in nature and not due to greater altruism: parents of
former soldiers expect to receive more back from ex-soldiers but do not give them
more in the Dictator game, indicating that Senders with an abducted son are aware of
the actual differences in trustworthiness of ex-soldiers relative to their non-abducted
peers, and they act based on this belief. Investments in the trust game, their beliefs
about Receiver’s trustworthiness, or giving in the Dictator game do not differ
significantly among Senders with no sons abducted. Thus, we conclude that former
5 For other creative uses of the trust game to understand issues in developing countries, see, for example,
Castilla (2015) and Karlan (2005).
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soldiers do not face mistrust or preference-based discrimination from members of
receiving communities.
The article contributes to the empirical work on the legacy of soldiering and warfare
on social behaviour. Policy makers and the media commonly assume that former
soldiers from violent armed groups are ‘social pariahs’ (New York Times, 2006) who
remain alienated from the members of their original communities and ‘at war’ in their
minds (Richards et al., 2003). While soldiering undoubtedly can have many negative
psychological impacts, our findings support a more optimistic view with respect to
social reintegration which is consistent with emerging micro-level evidence suggesting
that exposure to warfare, despite many negative legacies for individuals and societies,
elevates local cooperation and civic engagement (Bauer et al., 2016). The most closely
related study to ours is (Blattman, 2009) who shows, shortly after conflict in the same
setting we study, that forced soldiering for the LRA leads to greater likelihood of
voting.6 We build on this evidence by documenting positive effects of soldiering on
individual trustworthiness in incentivised experiments and by showing that change in
social behaviour is enduring and may last for at least five years post-conflict. The
pattern is also in line with other evidence which suggests that early stages of the life
cycle are critical for formation of trust, social preferences and other non-cognitive skills
(Cunha et al., 2006; Heckman, 2006; Sutter and Kocher, 2007; Fehr et al., 2008; Bauer
et al., 2014b).
Our article also contributes to the scarce empirical literature on attitudes and
behaviour towards the ex-combatants. In Sierra Leone, a survey of ex-combatants
documents that increased exposure to violence is associated with reports of a lower
community acceptance (Humphreys and Weinstein, 2007). Cilliers et al. (2016) show,
also in Sierra Leone, that reconciliation increases self-reported measures of
forgiveness and trust towards ex-combatants among villagers. In the Ugandan
context, we do not find evidence of mistrust or preference-based discrimination in
behavioural experiments, suggesting that these factors are unlikely to drive the
employment gap observed among former soldiers. Also, following the logic of the
attribution theory (Heider, 1958; Weiner, 1995; Gneezy et al., 2012) which proposes
that the controllability of an action or stigma affects the likelihood that one is subject
to helping or punishing behaviour, we speculate that the concerns about former
rebels bearing enduring stigma are less warranted in contexts where the receiving
population perceives participation in combat as involuntary, as was the case in the
LRA conflict.
The remainder of the article is organised as follows. Section 1 provides the
background about the conflict in Northern Uganda and the Lord’s Resistance Army.
Section 2 describes the sample selection and the experimental design. In Section 3 we
present the empirical results about behavioural differences between former soldiers
and their peers. Section 4 presents results about differential treatment of former
soldiers by their communities. Section 5 concludes.
6 See also Cassar et al. (2013) who find a negative link between reporting involvement in fighting and
social preferences and trust ten years after the civil war in Tajikistan. As the authors readily acknowledge,
however, their sample of ex-combatants is very small (10 individuals) due to challenges with identifying
former soldiers in this context.
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1. A Background on Soldiering in Northern Uganda
The leader of the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA), Joseph Kony, led a group of Acholi
fighters from the North of the country against the government from 1987 to 2006.
While Kony claims to seek a spiritual cleansing of Uganda and overthrow of the
government, Branch (2010) describes the roots of the conflict as originating both from
divisions between Acholis in the North and the national government, as well as an
internal political crisis within the Acholi society. Thus, in contrast to many civil
conflicts in Africa and elsewhere, the majority of perpetrators and victims of violence
shared the same ethnicity. Perhaps because of its brutality and lack of realistic
goals, the LRA has never – with the possible exception of an initial period from 1986 to
1989 – enjoyed support from the local Acholi population (Allen, 2010). With this lack
of civilian support, the LRA obtained supplies and new recruits by conducting raids on
rural homesteads, carting off food and forcibly conscripting both children and adults
to join the group.
The LRA attacks and abductions escalated dramatically after 1996, when Sudan started
to supply Kony with weapons and provided territory to build bases. Exposure to violence
in Kitgum and Gulu districts (which we study) was widespread, affecting virtually the
entire population.7 In 2005, around 90% of the adult population in Gulu and Kitgum
districts had been displaced, 67% had witnessed a child abduction and 48% had
witnessed a family member killed (Vinck et al., 2007). The violence with the LRA abated
after a peace agreement was signed in 2006 and the LRA has since withdrawn into South
Sudan, the Central African Republic and the Democratic Republic of Congo. At the time
of this study, in 2011, the camps for displaced people had been closed and themajority of
the population had returned to their home villages.
An estimated 24,000–38,000 child soldiers and 28,000–37,000 adults were forcibly
recruited by the LRA (Vinck et al., 2007). In the districts, we study the large scale and
seemingly indiscriminate abduction concerned around one quarter of youth aged
18–35. Youth were taken by groups of ten to twenty rebels during night raids on rural
homes (Beber and Blattman, 2013). The LRA has demonstrated a preference for
adolescent conscripts and youths under age 11 and over 24 were rarely taken, with the
highest abduction rate at around 14 years of age. Using a representative sample of
youths who were born between 1975 and 1991, (Blattman and Annan, 2010) show that,
except age, no individual or household characteristic predicted the likelihood of
conscription.
Blattman and Annan (2009) argue that the LRA targeted younger adolescents for
strategic reasons: individuals from this age range are more effective soldiers than
younger children, yet are easier to manipulate psychologically than older adolescents
or adults. Amone-P’Olak (2007) links this to the emphasis that Acholi culture places on
complete obedience to parents and other adults, which was exploited by the LRA as a
means of maintaining discipline.
While with the LRA, abductees went through a period of training and indoctrina-
tion. Former soldiers report that socialisation within the LRA included an emphasis on
7 For more details about the conflict and the impact of displacement see, e.g. Allen and Vlassenroot
(2010) and Fiala (2013).
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maintaining group cohesion, avoiding tension with other group members (Vermij,
2011) and obeying rules and orders within one’s unit (Mergelsberg, 2010). Two thirds
were forced to commit a crime or violence and a fifth were forced to murder soldiers,
civilians and sometimes family members in order to dissuade them from escaping.
Throughout their time with the LRA, abductees were under constant threat of
punishment, while financial or in-kind rewards were extremely rare (Blattman and
Annan, 2009). Given the results of our study, it is interesting that former abductees
have reported they were rewarded by commanders with more relaxed discipline if they
earned their trust (Amone-P’Olak, 2007). To supplement corporal punishment,
abductees were threatened with supernatural consequences, rooted in spiritual powers
attributed to Joseph Kony and other LRA leaders. For example, soldiers were often told
that spirits protected them from harm on the battlefield but only as long as they
followed certain rules. This placed abductees in a constant state of perceived
observation, which discouraged escape – even when abductees were alone and
unsupervised (Titteca, 2009).8
Despite this, 84% of abductees eventually left the LRA by escaping and a smaller
percentage was rescued or released (Blattman and Annan, 2010). Around 1% of
abductees were thought to be still with LRA in 2010. The remainder perished. To deal
with the influx of returning former soldiers, reception centres were set up by
government agencies and NGOs. Annan et al. (2006) estimate that 95% of former
abductees returned to their home communities.
2. Experimental Design
2.1. Sample Selection
The experiment was conducted from July to September 2011 in rural areas of Gulu and
Kitgum districts in Northern Uganda. We started with a list of communities known to
be affected by LRA abduction from Pham et al. (2007) and then identified villages in
which at least 20 ex-abductees were living, based on reports of village leaders, and
randomly selected 33 out of 52 such villages (Figure A1 in online Appendix A). In each
village, we randomly selected 40 households from a village roster of all households and
a member of each household was invited to participate in a pre-survey for which he or
she was compensated with 1,000 UGX (around $0.50 at the time). At this point, the
prospect of participating in an experiment was not mentioned. Using this information
from the pre-survey, we compiled a list of individuals and their characteristics and
identified those who fitted the criteria for Senders and Receivers.
Since our experimental design models an economic interaction between older
members of the community (who are more likely to control productive assets and who
were extremely unlikely to be soldiers in the LRA) and younger men, who may or may
not have been abducted by the LRA, selection criteria were different for Senders and
Receivers. In each village, we randomly selected on average 15 individuals from the
8 While the LRA may be extreme in its pervasive spiritual rules, Titteca (2009) notes that other rebel
groups have also enforced unit cohesion through unique spiritual beliefs. For instance, Richards (2006)
describes how the Revolutionary United Front used spirituality as a means of increasing unit cohesion and
creating distance between child soldiers and their communities in Sierra Leone.
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population of those between 35 and 55 years old to participate in the role of Senders.
Receivers were randomly sampled from the pool of young men between 18 and
34 years old, the age range with highest proportion of former soldiers.
We oversampled ex-soldiers in order to have a large enough sample for the position
of Receivers. Those invited to participate in the experiment were promised a show-up
fee of 2,000 UGX, with the opportunity to earn more. Overall, the response rate was
high for both Senders (96%) and Receivers (91% for former soldiers and 87% for
non-soldiers). In all, we have valid experimental data from 378 Senders and 337
Receivers. However, due to incomplete survey data, most of our analysis includes only
360 and 328 individuals, respectively. Subjects were not made aware that they had been
selected based on their conflict history and at no point during interviews with local
leaders, household pre-survey or subject invitations did we mention that the focus of
the study was reintegration of former soldiers.
2.2. Experimental Tasks
2.2.1. Senders
The individuals recruited as Senders were told that the task would be conducted in
pairs and that they would be matched with another person from a different but nearby
village. The first task consisted of the trust game. Senders were endowed with 2,000
UGX, which was equal to around $1 US at the time of the experiment, and is slightly
less than the average cash weekly income in our sample. Senders were told that
Receivers would not be given any initial endowment and were asked to decide between
three options, by choosing an amount, S 2 {0; 1,000; 2,000}, to transfer to their
partner. The amount transferred was automatically tripled by the experimenter and
the Receivers were given the option of sending back a portion of the received amount,
S 2 {0; 1,000, 2,000, . . . 3S}. Thus, Senders earned 2,000 – S +R, while Receivers
earned 3S  R.
In addition to choosing how much to transfer, we also elicited beliefs about how
much Senders expected to receive back. We used the strategy method, asking Senders
two questions about the expected back-transfer from their partner, contingent on
initially sending 1,000 UGX and 2,000 UGX, respectively. Accurate expectations – i.e.,
responses that exactly matched the actual behaviour of the Receiver – were rewarded
with 500 UGX.
In the trust game, gains are obtainable through cooperation. The amount
transferred by the Sender serves as an indication of his trust towards the Receiver or
of the two players’ ability to cooperate. The efficient outcome, which maximises total
welfare, requires the Sender to transfer the whole endowment to Receiver, since this
amount is tripled. When Receivers decide to return an amount larger than that initially
transferred by the Sender, both the Sender and Receiver are left better off than they
were at the outset of the experiment. However, a purely self-interested Receiver would
not be expected to return anything and a similarly self-interested Sender, anticipating
this, would not be expected to send anything, leading to an inefficient outcome which
fails to exploit potential gains from sending a positive amount.
The same subjects also participated in a triple dictator game. This task is designed to
mirror the trust game closely and differs only in that Receivers do not have the option
© 2017 Royal Economic Society.
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of sending anything back. Senders were endowed with 2,000 UGX and decided how
much to transfer to the (passive) Receiver. Upon deciding how much to allocate, the
task is over. The Sender’s earnings were 2,000  S, while the Receiver’s earnings were
3S. Thus, the triple dictator game is equivalent to a standard dictator game, except that
the amount transferred by Sender to Receiver is tripled. Since the interaction is
anonymous and the Receiver is passive in this task, purely selfish individuals would be
expected to not transfer any money to the Receiver. However, if Senders care about the
welfare of Receivers or adhere to sharing norms,9 they may transfer positive amounts.
In order to study differential treatment of former soldiers relative to their peers, we
implemented three treatment conditions in which we varied information on the length
of time one’s partner spent with LRA and communicated this to Senders. Prior to
making choices, the experimenter verbally provided each Sender with a profile
including several pieces of information about the Receiver. We varied information on
the Receiver’s experiences during the conflict, implemented across subjects. In the
LRA long treatment, the Sender was told that the Receiver had been with the LRA for
around a year, in the LRA short treatment he or she was told that the Receiver had
been with LRA for around one month. There was no reference to LRA abduction in
the control treatment.10
There are several noteworthy features of the information we provided subjects. First,
in addition to information related to the Receiver’s abduction status, we included
several pieces of information in the Receiver profile, in order to make relevant
information about LRA experience appear more natural and to mask the fact that this
information was of primary interest. Specifically, Senders were told that the Receiver
was between 18 and 34 years old, male, that he lived in a different village but in the
same sub-county, whether he was married or single and also that he had spent time in a
camp for internally displaced persons (IDPs) during the conflict. Since 90% of people
in the area we study spent time in IDP camps, this information should not convey
anything meaningful about the anonymous partner. However, we included former IDP
status in all treatments to avoid a potential confound that could arise if subjects in the
LRA treatments were reminded of the conflict and those in the control treatment were
not. Second, we matched Senders with Receivers so that the information reported in
these profiles reflected true characteristics of the Receivers. Third, Senders were
informed that Receivers would also receive a short profile of their characteristics (their
gender, that they were between 35 and 55 years old and that they lived in the same sub-
county but in a different village).
Since we used a within subject design in eliciting choices in the trust and dictator
games, we varied the order in which Senders completed the two tasks and control for
the order effects in estimation. Since the decision to trust is a risky one, we also elicited
Senders’ attitudes towards risk and use it as a control variable, as in, for example,
Ashraf et al. (2006). Specifically, Senders were given the choice between a lottery that
paid 1,000 UGX with a 50% probability and nothing with a 50% probability, or to
9 See List (2007) or Lazear et al. (2012) for thoughtful experiments on whether dictator game allocations
are motivated by social preferences or social pressure.
10 Subsequently, Senders were told that they were matched with an ex-abductee and were in fact matched
with ex-abductees; length of abduction was matched as closely as possible given the sample.
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accept a fixed amount with certainty, which was variously 300, 400 and 500 UGX. The
more an individual prefers the lotteries to the fixed amounts with certainty, the less risk
averse he is.
2.2.2. Receivers
In the trust game, Receivers chose how much to return to the Sender. We used the
strategy method, in which Receivers made two decisions, contingent on the two
positive amounts they might receive: 3,000 UGX and 6,000 UGX.11 The existing
literature considers three distinct types of social preferences, which can motivate
Receivers in a one-shot trust game to return positive amounts: unconditional altruism
(Andreoni and Miller, 2002), inequality aversion (Fehr and Schmidt, 1999) and
reciprocity, defined as rewarding kind acts with kind acts and retaliating against hostile
acts with hostile acts. In the dictator game, Receivers were passive and did not make any
choice. We also elicited beliefs about how much they actually expected to receive from
Senders in both the trust and the dictator games. Accurate responses were incentivised
with 500 UGX.
Prior to making choices, Receivers were informed about a set of characteristics of the
Sender with whom they were matched, as described above. We did not manipulate the
Senders’ profile. Receivers were also informed about which of their characteristics were
reported to Senders. Thus, ex-soldiers knew that Senders knew that they had been with
the LRA in the LRA treatments.12
2.3. Procedure and Payments
To ensure understanding of tasks, we adapted the explanation of the games from
written experimental protocols developed by Barr (2003) and Henrich et al. (2006) for
the specific purpose of conducting experiments in small scale societies, delivered all
instructions in the local language (Acholi) and extensively used visual aids to illustrate
options and payoffs (see Figure A2 in online Appendix A). The script was translated
into Acholi from the original English, then back-translated to English by a separate
translator to check for consistency. After a group explanation stage, subjects were
called individually and were read the profile of the player with whom they were
matched. Before making choices, participants were asked a series of comprehension
questions about payoff consequences of their actions as well as those of the other
player. Comprehension was generally high, and only 2% of Senders and 0.3% of
Receivers answered one or more of these questions incorrectly. (See online
Appendix B for full instructions.)
In each village, we ran two experimental sessions – first with Senders and later
during the same day with Receivers, with sessions overlapping in order to minimise the
chance of communication between participants.
11 A recent review of experiments studying the effect of the strategy method finds no cases in which its use
led to different treatment effects (Brandts and Charness, 2011). The advantage of strategy method is the
increased number of observations.
12 Former soldiers were not, however, informed that the Sender had any information regarding the length
of their soldiering, simply that they had been abducted.
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We took several steps to increase the level of anonymity when making choices.
Senders knew they were not matched with Receivers from the same village (and vice
versa). This was to minimise the role of strategic considerations due to a potential
impact of future (outside the laboratory) interactions, including potential fear of
reprisals from former soldiers. Next, subjects made decisions behind cardboard
dividers to keep their choices private from the experimenter who provided the one-on-
one explanation.13
Subjects were paid for either the trust or dictator game, based on a coin flip. The
payment was made in private, one on one, at the same location as the experimental
sessions, two days after the experiments. When collecting payments, subjects were
informed which task was chosen for payment and given money in closed envelopes. On
average, Senders’ total earnings were 4,012 UGX and Receivers’ earnings were 5,832,
including the show up fee.
2.4. Survey Data and Sample Characteristics
A large part of the survey instrument was the same for Senders and Receivers, and
included questions about individual characteristics and exposure to violence during
the conflict. For Senders, we included a specific module on the abduction experiences
of their family members, in particular children. Surveys for Receivers included
additional questions on exposure to violence, soldiering for the LRA, individual
community involvement and experience of hostilities. The wording of many questions
in the survey instrument was modelled after questions included in the Survey of War
Affected Youth, in which economists and psychologists specifically tested how to ask
sensitive questions about abduction-related experiences in a non-intrusive way (Annan
et al., 2006). Summary statistics of the main variables are in Table 1.
Our sample mostly consists of subsistence farmers, with 97% of respondents engaged
in agriculture. The subjects are very poor. Receivers report cash income of around
2,722 UGX ($1.35) on average over the past seven days, with Senders earning just over
2,000 UGX. More than 60% of subjects report no cash income at all over the previous
week, reflecting, in part, the high reliance on subsistence farming. The older sub-
sample selected for the role of Sender, participants have an average of 3.3 years of
schooling and less than quarter reported basic literacy. Receivers are relatively more
educated (around seven years of schooling).
Exposure to violence during the LRA conflict was extremely high in the area we
study. Overall, 68% of Senders and 78% of Receivers had a family member or friend
who died as a result of the conflict. Even among non-abducted participants, virtually all
individuals were affected by the conflict in some way: less than 2% (4%) of Receivers
(Senders) report no conflict exposure. Over half of Senders were attacked and 48%
received a physical injury. As expected, former abductees have even higher levels of
13 Further, decisions were tallied by a second person who did not know whose ID number corresponded to
whom. Payouts were made in private, by a third person who distributed sealed envelopes with rewards from
the experiment based on ID numbers. This procedure, explained to subjects prior to their choices, was
effective in keeping decisions and payoffs anonymous, although subjects’ perceptions of anonymity required
them to trust the experimenters to keep decisions and identification information separate.
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Table 1
Summary Statistics: Means (SD)
Receivers Senders
Sample (1) (2)
Panel (a): experimental outcomes
Trustworthiness: average % returned* 34.89
(23.39)
Expected trust: belief of Sender’s transfer
in trust game (1,000 UGX)
1.38
(0.61)
Expected altruism: belief of Sender’s transfer in
dictator game (1,000 UGX)
1.23
(0.72)
Trust: transfer in trust game (1,000 UGX) 1.12
(0.64)
Altruism: transfer in dictator game (1,000 UGX) 0.86
(0.75)
Expected trustworthiness: belief of average % returned 0.60
(0.30)
Panel (b): personal characteristics
Ever abducted by LRA (d) 0.55
(0.50)
Abduction length (years) 0.68
(1.72)
Abduction length (years)† 1.25
(2.18)
Son abducted (d) 0.22
(0.42)
Age 24.45 43.08
(4.89) (6.10)
Birth order 3.55 4.18
(2.33) (2.98)
No. of siblings 5.01
(2.74)
Mother no school (d) 0.65 0.85
(0.48) (0.36)
Father no school (d) 0.27 0.35
(0.45) (0.48)
Father alive in 1996 (d) 0.80
(0.40)
Mother alive in 1996 (d) 0.92
(0.27)
Married (d) 0.53 0.80
(0.50) (0.40)
No. of current HH members 6.92 8.11
(4.83) (3.56)
Cash earned in past seven days (1,000 UGX) 2.69 2.02
(10.23) (5.42)
Wealth 0.04 0.01
(2.22) (2.19)
Literate (d) 0.75 0.28
(0.43) (0.45)
Schooling (years) 7.07 3.27
(2.74) (3.11)
Risk preference scale¶ 1.56
(1.09)
Observations 337 378
Notes. (d) indicates dummy variable. Means. Standard deviations in parentheses. *Average percentage
returned from two separate decisions made by Receivers, conditional on Senders’ actions (strategy method).
Senders could send 1,000 or 2,000 UGX, Receivers could return 0–3,000 and 0–6,000 UGX, in each decision
respectively. †Results shown for sub-sample of ex-abductees. ‡Index of violence-related dummy variables,
elements of index listed below in italics. §1st principal component constructed from count of household
assets, including: jerry cans, wash basins, bicycles, mattresses radios, plates, livestock, chairs, mobile phones
and plows. ¶Risk scale is sum of instances when participant chose the safe option in lottery experiments (max.
3): 0 indicates low risk aversion, 3 indicates high risk aversion.
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conflict exposure. Over 85% of former abductees were attacked or received a beating
and 78% received physical injuries as a result of the conflict. The vast majority of
former abductees also witnessed violent acts: 83% witnessed a killing and 33%
witnessed a rape or sexual assault related to the conflict. (For more details about
exposure to violence and abduction experience, see Table A1.)
While the average combined length of time that abductees spent with the LRA is
1.24 years, there is a great deal of variation: around 20% spent under one month with
the LRA, half were abducted for less than six months, with around a quarter being
abducted for more than two years. Figure 1 shows the distribution of time spent with
the LRA among former abductees. The individual abduction experiences support the
preferred recruitment practices of the LRA described in the previous Section: the
majority of former abductees were child soldiers: the median age of abduction is
14 years and more than 70% were first abducted when younger than 18 years of age
(see Figure 2). Those who were abducted younger (13 or below) spent somewhat
longer time (around seven months on average) with the LRA than those who were
abducted at age 14 or above.
3. Behaviour and Beliefs of Former Soldiers
3.1. Predictors of Abduction
In this Section, we discuss whether it is plausible to consider selection into the armed
group as exogenous – without self-selection and the screening of recruits by rebels,
arguably the two most common concerns in this type of study. In particular, a
legitimate concern is that current differences in trustworthiness are results of pre-war
traits that lead to selection into the rebel group. First, since the LRA’s killings in 1991
0.5
0.4
0.3
Fr
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tio
n
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0
0 1 2 3 4
Total Abduction Length in Years
Fig. 1. Distribution of the Length of Abduction among Former Abductees
Notes. Histogram. N = 167, sample excludes former abductees who spent more than five years
with the LRA (10 individuals). Colour figure can be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com.
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destroyed the little remaining support which the group had and since after this
recruitment was only in the form of forced abduction (Allen and Vlassenroot, 2010;
Blattman and Annan, 2010), self-selection is unlikely. The median year of abduction in
our sample is 2001 and there are only two ex-soldiers who were abducted prior to 1991
(excluding these subjects does not affect our findings). Furthermore, in the analysis we
distinguish between those who were abducted at later age (14 and above) and those
abducted earlier. In fact, the main result is driven by those abducted at an early age,
arguably the group for which self-selection is extremely unlikely.
Second, our motivation for choosing to study the Ugandan conflict is the existence of
uniquely detailed evidence onLRA recruitment practices which suggests theLRAhas not
abducted, either deliberately or by chance, a select group.Most importantly, using a large
and representative sample of youth who were born prior to the conflict (1975–91),
Blattman and Annan (2010) show that pre-war household characteristics do not predict
the likelihood of abduction, in contrast to other civil wars in Africa (Humphreys and
Weinstein, 2007). We arrive at similar conclusions in Table 2 using our data, where we
study predictors of abductionby theLRA, age of abduction aswell as abduction length.As
in Blattman and Annan (2010), the only strong predictor is year of birth, which is
intuitive, given that abduction rates varied between different phases of the conflict. The
only other variable which is amarginally significant predictor of being abducted is having
a mother who had some schooling (p-value = 0.08).
The lack of systematic correlations between observable pre-existing family charac-
teristics (family size, education of father and mother, parental death) and abduction
status also accords with qualitative descriptions. As described in greater detail in
Blattman and Annan (2010), rebels typically invaded villages and homesteads at night,
abducting all civilians who could carry loot. Officers were instructed to release young
children and older adults but to keep all adolescent and young adult males.
0
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Fig. 2. Distribution of Age of first Abduction among Former Abductees
Notes. Histogram. N = 175. Colour figure can be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com.
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Accordingly, the most common age of abduction is around 14 years. Given the short
interval between the attack and abduction, LRA soldiers had little chance to assess the
character of potential recruits and therefore it is unlikely that ex-soldiers were selected
for their level of trustworthiness at the outset. There is also reason to believe that the
length of abduction is exogenous, to a degree. As reported in column (4) of Table 2,
we fail to find any pre-abduction characteristics that predict length of abduction. It
should be noted, however, that this does not imply that other forms of selection, after
abduction, did not play a role and we return to the issue in the empirical analysis and
discussion.14
3.2. Trustworthiness
In the following subsections, we present results for Receivers and analyse the link
between soldiering for the LRA and trustworthy behaviour in the trust game. We use
the following regression model:
Di ¼ aþ bAi þ cXi þ ei ; (1)
where Di is individual i’s action in the experiments, Ai is a variable capturing a
soldiering experience, Xi is a vector of individual characteristics, and ei is the error
term, with standard errors are clustered at the village level.15
We measure trustworthiness as the percentage returned in the trust game.
Participants made two conditional choices (using strategy method), deciding how
much to return both in case a Sender transferred 1,000 UGX (and the Receiver would
get 3,000 UGX) and when a Sender would transfer 2,000 UGX (and the Receiver would
get 6,000 UGX). The percentage sent back by Receivers is very similar in both cases:
34% and 35% on average, respectively. We begin by analysing the average of these two
amounts. These responses are broadly in line with previous studies using the trust
game: a meta-study of trust games by Johnson and Mislin (2011) finds that the average
percentage returned in experiments conducted in Africa is 31.9%. At the same time,
there is a great deal of variation in trustworthiness in our sample: the standard
deviation is 23.5% (see Figure 3).
Does the level of trustworthiness of former soldiers differ from their peers? In
column (1) of Table 3, panel (a) we regress a dummy variable that equals 1 if an
individual had ever been abducted by the LRA on trustworthiness. The results indicate
that former soldiers returned more in the trust game than their peers: abduction is
associated with an increase of roughly 5 percentage points in trust-game back-transfers
(p-value = 0.14). While this positive effect is (marginally) insignificant, we do not find
that ex-soldiers are less trustworthy than peers, as is suggested by some portrayals of
14 The vast majority of abductions in our sample ended when the individual escaped (84%); while
unobservable, personal characteristics may have determined the likelihood of such escapes, Pham et al.
(2007) report that the most common conditions for escape was during fighting or ambushes, and
appropriate opportunities may have arisen exogenously.
15 Due to the relatively low number of villages in our sample (33), we also explore the effect of utilising
bootstrap clustering. Specifically, we use the ‘wild’ bootstrap method for clustering standard errors proposed
(Cameron et al., 2008). The results are robust to clustering method for all results on trustworthiness in
Table 3: all coefficients that are significant at the 10% and 95% levels in the original specification remain
significant at the respective levels. For group membership, the results are robust in panel (a) only.
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ex-abductees. Furthermore, we examine the relationship between abduction length
and trustworthiness, since the simple binary measure includes individuals who were
abducted for very short periods of time (as little as one day) as well as those abducted
for long periods of time. In column (1) of panel (b) we find a strong positive
relationship between length of soldiering and the amount returned in the trust game
(p-value < 0.001).
Next, we test whether the link between soldiering and trustworthiness is more
pronounced or more enduring when soldiering is experienced during an early age,
compared to soldiering during adolescence and adulthood. Previous experimental
evidence among young children consistently shows that social preferences develop
during the age range from 3 to around 13 years (Fehr et al., 2008, 2013; Almas et al.,
2010; Bauer et al., 2014b), suggesting this a sensitive period in the development of
social preferences. The evidence is scarce and less conclusive for the period after
13 years – two studies that include both young children as well as adolescents suggest
that development of fairness motivations plateaus after the age of 13–14 years (Almas
et al., 2010; Fehr et al., 2013). We exploit the fact that the age of abduction ranges in
our sample from 6 to 30 and the median age of first abduction is 14, and test whether
the effect of soldiering on trustworthiness depends on whether it was experienced
during an early age, rather than during adolescence and adulthood.
We find that age of abduction matters. In Column (2) of Table 3, panel (a) we
compare three groups of subjects: those who were abducted at an early age (less than
14), those who were abducted at later age and those who had never been abducted
(omitted). We find that those who were abducted young transfer back 8.2 percentage
points more compared to the non-abducted group. Compared to the median
percentage returned by non-abductees, 33.3%, this represents an economically
important increase – in case 2,000 UGX is sent, an increase in this size represents
0
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Fig. 3. Distribution in Average Trustworthiness (Average Percentage Returned in Trust Game)
Notes. Histogram. N = 328. Colour figure can be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com.
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around 492 UGX, which is more than the average daily cash income in our sample. At
the same time, we find virtually no difference in behaviour between those who
soldiered during later age and the non-abducted group (p-value = 0.72). Table A3
supports these findings by providing more detailed classification. We divide the
ex-soldiers into seven groups, based on age of abduction (<10, 10–11, 12–13, 14–15,
16–17, 18–19, >20). Although the results are less statistically significant given the low
number of observations for each of these groups, we find that, when compared with
the non-abducted group, there are large positive coefficients for each of the three
groups with the lowest age of abduction (<10, 11–12, 12–13), while the coefficients for
all the groups with the higher age of abduction are small.
As with the binary measures of abduction, we observe that the effect of the length of
time spent soldiering is stronger for those who were abducted when younger than
14 years of age and mute for those abducted at a later age. Column (2) of Table 3,
panel (b) demonstrates this by including an interaction between an indicator of first
abduction at 14 years age or older and the total length of abduction. The coefficient
for years of abduction, which shows the link with trustworthiness for those who were
abducted at early age (<14 years), is positive and larger than in the baseline regression.
At the same time, we find a negative interaction effect between length of abduction
and being abducted later than at 14 years of age. The two coefficients are roughly the
same size, indicating that the effect of time spent with the LRA on trustworthiness is
specific for former soldiers who were abducted younger than 14 and that there is no
such link for those abducted during late adolescence and adulthood.
In the main regression specification, we control for measures of wealth, education as
well current family characteristics, indicating that differences in current socio-
economic characteristics are unlikely to explain the differences in choices. The
estimated effect of soldiering during early age on trustworthiness is robust to using
different specifications: with no controls for any background variables (column (3) of
Table 3), and when we add controls for village fixed effects (Column (4)).16
In the previous Section, we argued that abduction was, to a large extent, exogenous,
conditional on observable characteristics such as age. We can gauge the degree to which
unobservable variablesmight bias our estimates of abduction’s effect on trustworthiness by
computing the ratio of the coefficient from the model with controls over the difference in
coefficients between models with and without controls, after Altonji et al. (2005).
17
When
the difference between coefficients inmodels with andwithout controls is smaller, the ratio
goesup– the larger the ratio, thegreater the influenceofomitted variableswouldneedtobe
16 Note that age of first abduction and length of abduction are negatively correlated (r = 0.23, p = 0.00)
and those abducted before the age of 14 spent nearly eight months longer with the LRA than those who were
abducted older (t-test, p = 0.05). This relationship raises a concern that both variables may capture a similar
effect. In Table A4, we conduct a sensitivity analysis and regress trustworthiness on both binary measures of
abduction before 14 years of age and abducted older and add length of abduction. When compared to the
baseline model (i.e. excluding length of abduction), the coefficient for ‘abducted young’ decreases only
slightly. Also, the observation that length and age of abduction interact (Table 3), i.e. that length of
abduction only predicts greater trustworthiness among younger ex-abductees – somewhat alleviates the
concern.
17 The ratio is obtained by comparing the coefficient from the regression with no controls, b^NC ; with
estimate from the model with the full set of controls included, b^C ; and computing b^C=ðb^NC  b^C Þ: Also see
Bellows and Miguel (2009) and Cassar et al. (2011) who use a similar approach.
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in order to change theoutcomeof the estimation.The ratio is 5.88 for the ‘abducted young’
dummy (columns (2)–(3) of Table 3, panel (a)) and 31.14 for abduction lengthon the sub-
sample of former abductees who were first abducted when younger than 14. These values
are large enough that selection onunobservable factors is unlikely tobias our results to such
an extent that the effects we measure would no longer be present.
The observed differences in trustworthiness are not simply due to a higher
propensity to send a positive amount rather than nothing. If this were the case, it might
indicate more idiosyncratic behaviour, such as a willingness to meet minimum social
expectations, rather than increased trustworthiness, per se. In column (5) of Table 3,
we analyse the sub-sample of subjects that returned a positive amount in the trust game
and find similar patterns as in the entire sample. In other words, the link between child
soldiering and greater back transfers is driven by differences at both the intensive and
extensive margins (Table A5). Further, we consider which type of social preference is
likely to motivate more trustworthy behaviour among former soldiers. The observed
patterns suggest that it is driven neither by greater inequality aversion, since former
soldiers are not more likely to choose an equal split of payoffs (Table A5), nor by a
greater preference for reciprocity, since we do not see a greater difference in the
proportion sent back when a Sender sends 2,000 UGX (arguably a kind act) compared
to when he or she sends 1,000 UGX. In fact, in columns (6)–(7) of Table 3 we find that
the link between child soldiering and the proportion sent back is similar for both
potential amounts that could have been sent by Sender. Thus, we conclude that the
greater trustworthiness of former soldiers is likely to be motivated by elevated
unconditional altruism or by a greater adherence to sharing norms.
To supplement the results from the experiment, we examine whether soldiering is
systematically related to behaviour in the naturally occurring world by replacing the
experimental measure with a survey-based proxy of pro-social behaviour. We find
strikingly similar pattern. Soldiering is associated with membership in 0.47 more
groups (p = 0.01), and as with trustworthiness, this is primarily due to those abducted
at a young age (columns (8)–(9) of Table 3). We also see that group membership
increases with abduction length. When looking at other post-reintegration outcomes,
we find that younger abductees also attend church more often and are less likely to
report quarrels with family and community members (Table A6).
LRA soldiering captures a host of experiences. As expected, soldiering is positively
related to survey-based indices of violence received, committed or witnessed by an
individual. Interestingly in light of previous findings, LRA experiences also seem to be
related to age of abduction. We find that those who were abducted at an earlier age
report more exposure to LRA prayer ceremonies, receiving more violence and were
also more likely to be forced to beat and kill others while with the LRA, compared to
those who were abducted at a later age (panel (b) of Table A7). They were also more
likely to participate in informal reintegration ceremonies after returning18 and to
18 The index of participation in informal reintegration ceremonies is the sum of two indicator variables:
whether the subject took part in a traditional welcoming ceremony and a cleansing ceremony. The
welcoming ceremony involves stepping on an egg as a way of welcoming back people who have been gone for
a long period of time. The cleansing ceremony, Mato Oput, is a ceremony for creating peace among people
who aggrieved another party, which has been adapted as means of forgiving and accepting abductees after
they return from the LRA (for more details see Allen, 2010).
© 2017 Royal Economic Society.
2018] T RU S T I N G FO RM E R R E B E L S 1805
attend church (Table A6). Cilliers et al. (2016) document that community reconcil-
iation increased forgiveness to former soldiers in Sierra Leone. Yet, we show that the
violence exposure, reintegration measures or church attendance post-LRA are not
strongly related to trustworthy behaviour in the experiment. This suggests that none of
these specific abduction-related experiences can be singled out as driving the observed
effect of abduction on trustworthiness in the setting we study (Table A8).
A series of further robustness checks is discussed in online Appendix A, in order to
assess concerns about truthfulness of reporting abduction status, comprehension of
the tasks, the role of guilt, robustness with respect to excluding long-term abductees
and those who were abducted outside of the LRA’s preferred age range, and thus may
have been selected more carefully. Results are robust in all of these cases.
3.3. Expectation of Trust and Altruism
To measure expectations of trust and altruism of older community members towards
participants, we elicited beliefs from each Receiver about the amount they expect to
receive from the Sender in both the trust game and dictator game. On average, out of a
possible 2,000 UGX, Receivers expect to receive 1,377 UGX in the trust game and
1,233 in the dictator game.
Do former soldiers expect to be less trusted than their peers? Note that Receivers were
informed that their profile, which included whether they had been with LRA, had been
provided to Senders prior to Senders’ decisions, and thus a difference in expectations of
trust could arise if ex-soldiers expect others to differentiate between ex-soldiers and their
peers, or if abductees have different beliefs about the behaviour of others in general.
In columns (1)–(2) of Table 4, we find virtually no link between soldiering and the
amount that was expected to be received in the trust game. In column (4) of panel (b), we
do find a small negative relationship between length of abduction and expected
allocation in the dictator game: for individuals whowere abducted younger than 14 years
old, each additional year of abduction is associated with expecting 4 percentage points
less in the dictator game (p = 0.03). However, in panel (a), column (4) of Table 5 the
correlation between being abducted below 14 and expected kindness is small and
statistically insignificant (p = 0.66). Thus, we conclude that if ex-abductees do expect
discrimination in either the trust or dictator games, the magnitude of any effect is very
small and likely driven by long-term abductees. As we discuss in the next Section inmore
detail, former soldiers do not, in fact, face any discrimination from communitymembers,
and the lack of any robust finding with regards to abduction and expected trust and
altruism indicates that former soldiers have qualitatively accurate beliefs.
3.4. Alternative Explanations
Here, we discuss alternative mechanisms which could explain the observed
heightened trustworthiness of former soldiers compared to their peers. The first
possibility is a behavioural change caused by soldiering experience. The evidence
documented in this Section is consistent with the idea that social preferences are
malleable, especially during childhood, and that soldiering during this sensitive
period affects preferences.
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While the conflict in Northern Uganda represents a unique opportunity to study the
effects of soldiering without the conscious self-selection and systematic screening in the
recruitment stage that is at work in many other civil wars, as discussed in
subsection 3.1, there are still several ways in which personal characteristics could have
influenced surviving the conflict, and returning and staying home. We now consider
whether these mechanisms could explain the full set of findings.
Personal characteristics – including trustworthiness – might have affected how LRA
soldiers were treated by commanders after forcible recruitment. In particular,
untrustworthy individuals may have been more severely punished or given more
dangerous assignments, which could have resulted in higher mortality and thus
underrepresentation in our sample. Annan et al. (2006) estimate that 15% of ex-
abductees did not return and can be presumed dead. We use the sensitivity analysis
proposed by Lee (2009) and calculate bounds of the effect of soldiering, taking into
account selective survival. We trim the distribution of the outcome variable in the
group with less attrition (the non-abducted) and we drop 15% of the most selfish
Table 4
Abduction by the LRA and Expected Trust and Altruism
Dependent variable Expected trust: Expected altruism:
Belief of Sender’s transfer
in trust game
Belief of Sender’s transfer
in dictator game
Sample Receivers
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel (a)
Abducted (d) 0.06 0.00
(0.07) (0.08)
Abducted young (<14 years) (d) 0.05 0.05
(0.10) (0.11)
Abducted as adolescent/adult (≥14) (d) 0.07 0.05
(0.09) (0.12)
Constant 1.65*** 1.66*** 1.19*** 1.28***
(0.33) (0.32) (0.43) (0.46)
Observations 333 333 333 333
R2 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.04
Panel (b)
Abduction length (years) 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.04**
(0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Abducted as adolescent/adult (≥14) (d) 0.05 0.03
(0.11) (0.13)
Abduction length 9 abduction
adolescence/adult (≥14)
0.00 0.03
(0.03) (0.04)
Constant 1.64*** 1.68*** 1.26*** 1.31***
(0.33) (0.32) (0.44) (0.44)
Observations 328 328 328 328
R2 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04
Notes. OLS. Robust, standard errors in parentheses, clustered at village level. * significant at 0.10%;
** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. (d) indicates dummy variable. In columns (1)–(3) the dep. var. is
the amount Receivers expected to be transferred by Senders in trust game. In columns (4)–(6) the
dependent variable is the amount Receivers expected to be transferred by Senders in the dictator game. In all
columns, we control for the same set of variables as in Table 3.
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individuals. The results imply that under such implausible dramatic selection, LRA
soldiering during childhood still increases trustworthiness, but the effect is small and
not statistically significant (Table A10 in online Appendix A). Thus, we cannot rule out
that the effect of LRA abduction on higher trustworthiness in the population is caused
by higher mortality of less trustworthy recruits.
Table 5
Behaviour Towards Former Soldiers: Trust and Altruism
Sample
Senders
All Sons abducted All Sons abducted
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel (a)
Dependent variable Trust: transfer in trust game Altruism: transfer in Dictator Game
LRA-long treatment (d) 0.07 0.04 0.53** 0.00 0.02 0.22
(0.08) (0.10) (0.22) (0.11) (0.12) (0.28)
LRA-short treatment (d) 0.07 0.01 0.36 0.01 0.02 0.00
(0.10) (0.13) (0.27) (0.10) (0.12) (0.21)
LRA-long t. 9 son abducted 0.50** 0.08
(0.21) (0.29)
LRA-short t. 9 son abducted 0.29 0.04
(0.24) (0.23)
Son abducted (d) 0.12 0.14 0.13 0.17
(0.08) (0.12) (0.10) (0.17)
Constant 0.49* 0.44 0.70 0.87** 0.87** 0.11
(0.28) (0.27) (0.64) (0.41) (0.41) (0.81)
Observations 360 360 82 360 360 82
R2 0.09 0.11 0.28 0.08 0.08 0.18
Panel (b)
Dependent variable Investment: difference between
trust and dictator allocations
(1000 UGX)
Expected backtransfer in trust
game: directly elicited 1st
order beliefs (percent, pooled)
LRA-long treatment (d) 0.08 0.05 0.75*** 0.03 0.01 0.16*
(0.10) (0.10) (0.27) (0.04) (0.04) (0.09)
LRA-short treatment (d) 0.07 0.00 0.36* 0.05 0.04 0.11
(0.08) (0.10) (0.21) (0.04) (0.04) (0.11)
LRA-long t. 9 son abducted 0.59** 0.13
(0.24) (0.09)
LRA-short t. 9 son abducted 0.33 0.05
(0.21) (0.09)
Son abducted (d) 0.02 0.32* 0.00 0.05
(0.10) (0.16) (0.05) (0.07)
Constant 0.46 0.53 0.81 0.65*** 0.64*** 0.58*
(0.41) (0.41) (0.82) (0.14) (0.15) (0.30)
Observations 359 359 82 360 360 82
R2 0.05 0.07 0.20 0.06 0.06 0.17
Notes. OLS. Standard errors, clustered at village level in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%;
*** significant at 1%. (d) indicates dummy variable. Dependent variables in 1,000 UGX. LRA-long treatment
andLRA-short treatments are indicator variables equal to one if Sender was informed that Receiver was with the
LRA for around one year and around one month, respectively, and zero otherwise. The omitted group is the
control condition, in which no reference to LRA abduction was made. In all regressions we control for order of
the tasks, marital status of partner, indices of violence received and witnessed, index of violence against family,
age, gender, marital status, results of risk experiment, wealth, log of income and current household size.
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Nevertheless, the existing evidence suggests that children were less likely to be allocated
dangerous tasks and participate in battles. Annan and Blattman (2009) note that:
Rebel officers questioned a young child’s ability to handle a firearm, or be an
effective fighter . . . In general, the survey evidence suggests young children
below the age of 11 or 12 were entrusted with military tasks less frequently than
older youth, while adolescents seem to have been at least as dependable and
effective as young adults (and in some cases more so).
Another concern is that less trustworthy returning soldiers were less likely to be
accepted by the home communities and thus may have been forced to migrate to cities
or villages outside of the regions we study. However, Annan et al. (2006) estimate that
around 95% of ex-abductees stayed after returning to their home communities, which
suggests that migration was quite rare. Also, it is not clear why such selection would be
specific only for youth who were abducted at an early age.
4. Behaviour of Receiving Communities Towards Former Soldiers
In this Section, we explore whether Senders behave differently towards former soldiers
and, if so, whether this is due to social preferences or beliefs about trust-worthiness.
The average age of the Senders is 43 years and 56% are female. The randomisation was
successful; we find no statistically significant differences in observable characteristics
across the experimental manipulation of information about LRA history of the
Receiver (Table A11 in online Appendix A).
4.1. Trust and Altruism
On average, Senders transfer 55.7% of their 2,000 UGX endowment to the Receivers in
the trust game, which is close to average proportion found in other studies (around
50% of the endowment, Johnson and Mislin, 2011). We do not find any statistically
significant difference across the three LRA treatments. In the LRA long treatment, in
which Senders were told that their partner had been with the LRA for ‘around one
year,’ subjects sent 57.5% of their endowment, on average, compared to 55.2% in the
control treatment, in which no information on abduction history was provided. The
difference is not statistically significant, according to a two-sided t-test (p = 0.46). In
the LRA short treatment, in which it was communicated that Receivers had been with
the LRA for ‘around one month,’ the average trust-game allocation was 54.5%, which
also does not differ significantly from the control treatment (p = 0.89). We confirm
this lack of a treatment difference through regression analysis in columns (1)–(2) of
Table 5, panel (a) in which our exogenous explanatory variables of interest are
dummies for the LRA short and LRA long treatments and the control treatment is the
omitted category. We control for Sender’s observable characteristics (age, gender,
attitude to risk, wealth, income, household size and an index of conflict exposure). On
average, we find a positive but statistically insignificant effect of the LRA treatments.
Nor is there a statistically significant difference between the distribution of choices
between either of the LRA treatments and the control group (Table A12 in online
Appendix A).
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In theory, the amount sent in the trust game reflects both expectations of
trustworthiness as well as social preferences towards the Receiver (Ashraf et al., 2006;
Fehr 2009, Sapienza et al. 2013). Understanding these motivations is necessary for
determining whether any discrimination towards ex-abductees is indeed absent, since
they might influence trust-game allocations in opposite directions and thus produce a
non-result in the trust game, when in fact Senders do have different beliefs and
preferences towards former abductees. For example, community members might
harbour anger towards former child-soldiers but at the same time be aware of ex-
abductees’ greater trustworthiness.
Choices in the dictator game allow us to measure taste for discrimination against
or favouritism towards former soldiers. In the dictator game, Senders transferred
43% out of their 2000 UGX endowment on average. We find no effect of LRA
treatments on the mean amount sent in the dictator game (column (4) of Table 6,
panel (a)). The coefficients for LRA treatments on dictator game allocations is both
very small in magnitude and statistically insignificant. It is unlikely that this is due to
a low sample size. Given our sample size and the variation in dictator allocations, we
have the statistical power to detect a treatment effect of 183 UGX at (9.2 percentage
points) at the 5% level. This is equivalent to 0.25 standard deviations in our
sample.19 We thus conclude that there is no evidence of differences in kindness
towards ex-soldiers and non-soldiers. We also find little difference in terms of
distribution of the amount sent (Table A12 in online Appendix A). In line with the
intuition, we find that the amount sent in the trust game is positively related to the
amount sent in the dictator game (p-value = 0.00), which measures altruism, as
well as to the amount that Sender’s believed would be returned by Receivers
(p-value = 0.02).
In order to understand possible differences in expectations of trustworthiness, we
use two different measures. First, we directly examine beliefs about how much Senders
expect Receivers to transfer back. The variable of interest is the mean of the
percentage expected by the Sender for both possible amounts he or she could have
sent: 1,000 UGX and 2,000 UGX.20 Second, we exploit the within subject design of our
experiments and identify pure behavioural trust (i.e. the part of the transferred
amount motivated by expected return) by taking the difference between what the
Sender transferred in the trust game and what was voluntarily given in the triple
dictator game, using an approach proposed in Cox (2004).21 This difference can be
thought of as the ‘investment portion’ of the trust game allocation, or the strategic
element of trusting behaviour Fehr (2009).
19 Calculated using a power of 0.80 and a significance level of 0.05. The intra-class correlation within
villages for dictator allocations is 0.00871.
20 The mean expected return on investment is 82% and the Senders expect a slightly higher return on
investment when sending 2,000 UGX compared to sending 1,000 UGX. Thus, the Senders have inaccurately
optimistic expectations, since the actual return on investment, based on the actual behaviour of Receivers, is
only 5.6%. Such overly optimistic expectations of trustworthiness seem to be a common finding for high
levels of trust (Ashraf et al., 2006).
21 This approach implies that 77% of the amount sent in the trust game is due to altruistic preferences and
23% is motivated by pure trust, i.e. expected return from Receivers. However, these numbers should be
interpreted cautiously; see, for example, Fehr (2009) for why taking the difference in the amount sent in the
trust game and dictator game may understate the magnitude of behavioural trust.
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On average, we find positive but small effects of the LRA treatments on the
expectation of trustworthiness. We obtain similar results both when analysing the
‘investment portion’ of the amount sent in the trust game – the amount transferred in
the trust game minus the amount sent in the dictator game – (Table 5, panel (b),
column (1)) as well as the percent expected to be transferred back (column (4)).
Thus, we conclude that former soldiers do not face systematic mistrust or preference-
based discrimination in the communities we study.
4.2. Social Distance and Behaviour Towards Former Abductees: Subjects with Former-abductee
Sons
Assuming that Senders are aware of behavioural differences between ex-abductees and
their peers and are, at least in part, motivated by self-interest, one would expect to see
more trusting behaviour in the LRA 1-year treatment to reflect the higher proportion
returned by ex-soldiers. Although we study relatively small villages, in which people
generally know who was with the LRA and who was not, some Senders may not interact
with former soldiers on a regular basis. We examine one personal characteristic that is
likely to increase accuracy of beliefs: whether Senders have at least one son who was
abducted by the LRA during the conflict (N = 82).
Figure 4 and columns (2)–(3) of Table 5, panel (a) reveal a sharp difference in the
effects of the LRA treatments on trust-game allocations for the sub-sample of those who
have a formerly abducted son and those who do not. For the sub-sample of participants
with no abductee sons, there is no significant difference between trust allocations in
the three LRA treatments. In contrast, those who do have sons that were abducted send
more when playing with an ex-soldier in both the LRA 1-month and LRA 1-year
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Fig. 4. Amount Sent in Trust Game: Disaggregated by Treatment and the Abduction History of Subjects’
Sons
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treatments. Compared to the control group, they sent 360 UGX (p-value = 0.20) more
to the LRA 1-month group and 530 UGX more to the LRA one year group
(p-value = 0.02). Put differently, while we find no difference in trust towards the non-
abducted (control) group between those who had a son abducted and those who did
not, we find a positive interaction effects between having an abducted son and the LRA
treatments on trust.22
This differential treatment towards ex-abductees from parents of former LRA
soldiers seems to be motivated by beliefs of higher expected return, rather than greater
empathy, as indicated by dictator-game results. Figure 5 compares the mean amount
sent in the dictator game across LRA treatments, separately for the participants with
and without an abducted son. We observe virtually no effect of LRA treatments in
either of these two groups. This is confirmed by the regression analysis in Table 5,
panel (a), where we find no interaction effect between having an abducted son and
LRA treatments (column (5)) and no statistically significant treatment effect on the
sub-sample with former-abductee sons (column (6)).
Rather, subjects with former abductee sons transfer more in the trust-game to former
abductees due to a higher expected return. For participants who have an abducted son,
the difference in the amount sent in the trust game and in the dictator game increases
by UGX 360 in the LRA 1-month treatment and by UGX 750 in the LRA one year
treatment (column (3) of Table 5, panel (b)). The magnitude of this increase is also
economically significant (around 37% of Senders’ average weekly cash income). In
contrast, there is virtually no effect of LRA treatments in the sub-sample that do not
0.5
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Fig. 5. Amount Sent in Dictator Game, Disaggregated by Treatment and the Abduction History of Subjects’
Sons
22 In the main estimations we use OLS. The results are robust to using alternative estimators, such as
ordered probit, which takes into account the discrete nature of the dependent variable (Table A13 in online
Appendix A).
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have an abducted son (column (2)). The difference in the effects of the LRA
treatments across the two sub-samples is statistically significant.
We observe a qualitatively similar pattern when analysing expected return. Among
the sub-sample of Senders with a son who was abducted, expectations are higher when
Senders are matched with a former soldier, p = 0.07 (column (6) of Table 5, panel
(b)). Among those Senders with no ex-abductee sons, there was virtually no difference
in expectations of how much Receivers would return across the LRA treatments,
p = 0.39 (column (5)).
4.3. Discussion and Further Results
The set of results presented above strongly suggests that having an ex-soldier son
improves knowledge about behavioural differences between ex-soldiers and their
peers, which in turn affects actions in trust-based interactions. Here, we discuss
possible alternative interpretations. First, it could be argued that having an ex-abductee
son may correlate with other war-related experiences, and such shared experience of
violence may drive differential treatment of ex-soldiers. To test for this possibility, we
study the interaction effects between different measures of exposure to violence
(violence received, violence against family, violence witnessed or having a daughter
abducted by the LRA) and LRA treatments on the amount sent in the trust game. The
coefficients are small and statistically insignificant (Table A14 in online Appendix A).
Further, the interaction effect of having an abductee son and the LRA treatments is
robust to controlling for observable characteristics, measures of violence exposure and
the interaction terms of these variables with LRA treatments, indicating that the
difference in the impact of LRA treatments among those with abductee sons is not due
to differences in other types of war-related experiences or differences in observable
characteristics.
Next, since Senders were sampled from the pool of older villagers, who were outside
the age range targeted by the LRA, the increased trust among parents of LRA soldiers
is unlikely to represent social capital within the LRA, due to a common connection. An
alternative interpretation is that people with more familiarity with the LRA are trained
to fear ex-soldiers and cooperate more out fear. While this explanation is consistent
with greater transfers in the trust game, it struggles to explain why the transfers are not
higher in the dictator game as well and why Senders accurately expect increased
trustworthiness of ex-soldiers.
Last, we consider the possibility that the salience of Receiver’s LRA history during
the experiments was greater for individuals with abductee sons, which, potentially,
could explain the observed interaction effect on trust. The salience of this information
was generally high: in the LRA treatments, 75% of individuals reported that the
Receiver with whom they were matched was an abductee in an open-ended question
asked approximately. 30 minutes after the experiments. We find no relationship
between having an abductee son and recall of the Receiver’s abduction.
In order to test whether the lack of taste-based discrimination is consistent with
attribution theory (Heider, 1958), we elicited the perceptions of the degree to which
LRA soldiering was avoidable from members of receiving communities. We sampled a
new group of 72 respondents from the same population several months after the main
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study. Each person received two fictitious profiles of a formerly abducted person. We
randomly manipulated the information about length of abduction (‘around one
month’ or ‘around one year’). Respondents were asked two related questions: to what
extent do you think this person could have avoided being abducted (completely
avoidable, somewhat avoidable and not avoidable)? How likely do you think it is that
this person had the chance to escape before they actually left the LRA (very likely;
somewhat likely; not very likely)? Overall, 80% of respondents thought that abduction
was completely unavoidable and 70% thought that such a person would have no
chance to escape from the LRA before they actually left. These results reveal that in the
setting we study, soldiering is not seen as an outcome of individual choice, which may
help to explain why we do not find taste-based discrimination against former soldiers.
5. Conclusions
The common view is that the reintegration of soldiers after civil wars is complicated by
the lingering effects of trauma among them, as well as the resentment and ostracism
that they face from receiving communities. Using data from economic experiments
implemented among a large sample of participants across Northern Uganda, we find
that soldiering for the Lord’s Resistance Army is positively linked with more
trustworthy behaviour. The effect is driven by the behaviour of former soldiers who
were abducted at an early age (<14 years). We find neither systematic mistrust nor
preference-based discrimination against former soldiers. Moreover, individuals with
abductee sons, and thus with better knowledge of their behaviour, trust ex-soldiers
more compared to their peers, because they expect ex-soldiers to be more trustworthy.
We establish these findings by:
(i) separately observing the behaviour of former soldiers as well as the treatment
of former soldiers by receiving communities;
(ii) focusing on two important aspects of interpersonal relations, namely, trust
and trustworthiness, which are difficult to measure in surveys; and
(iii) measuring behaviour in incentive-compatible field experiments, in contrast to
responses to survey questions.
Our results are broadly consistent with recent theories (Choi and Bowles, 2007) and
emerging micro-level evidence (Bauer et al., 2016) linking war and the development of
altruism and other forms of local cooperation. Given the need for group cohesion
during inter-group fighting, the preferences of former child soldiers may have adapted
to the war environment. Such preference adaptation may have evolutionary under-
pinnings or be due to socialisation – former soldiers may have painfully learned the
importance of obeying rules and being trustworthy and they may have internalised
such behaviour. Another mechanism linking soldiering and trustworthiness is that
armed groups treat unreliable individuals extremely harshly, increasing the prevalence
of trustworthy types in the population of former soldiers.
We recognise several caveats with regard to the generalisability of our surprisingly
optimistic findings on the legacy of soldiering. First, while we find that child soldiering
leads to increased trustworthiness, we do not find similar effects in those who soldiered
as older adolescents or adults. The latter group represents the majority of fighters in
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most conflicts, and it is an open question whether the impact of soldiering on
trustworthiness among adult soldiers is similar. Possibly, there exists an analogous, but
less enduring, change in preferences among adults in the short run that we do not
capture – our data were gathered roughly nine-years post-conflict. Second, while the
indiscriminate forcible recruitment strategy used by the LRA helps us to overcome
some identification issues, it might be specific to Northern Uganda. Thus, our finding
that former child soldiers are more trustworthy than their peers may not generalise to
conflicts in which rebel recruitment strategies or self-selection based on individual
characteristics play a relatively larger role in determining average personality traits
among former soldiers, as compared to the causal effect of soldiering. Last, the LRA’s
recruitment strategy may also affect the generalisability of results on the behaviour of
receiving communities towards former soldiers. Northern Uganda was highly affected
by the conflict and a large fraction of the population witnessed child abduction by the
LRA and perceive participation in the insurgency as involuntary. We suspect that our
finding that ex-combatants do not face preference-based discrimination might not
generalise to post-conflict societies where participation in insurgency is perceived as a
voluntary decision.
Although our findings provide some reason for optimism with respect to the
prospects of reintegration of child soldiers in their communities after they return from
rebel groups, this does not, however, necessarily imply that the elevated trustworthiness
among soldiers promotes greater peace in general. To the extent that increased
trustworthiness captures a general tendency to obey and behave according to
expectations of others, including LRA commanders, such behavioural response may
have contributed to stability of the rebel group and ultimately to longer violent
conflicts. In fact, recent evidence indicates that while greater social capital may foster
favourable social outcomes during peaceful times, it may fuel destruction at times of
conflict (Satyanath et al., 2016).
Our results also speak to theories of child soldiering, which offer explanations for
why many insurgent groups, including LRA, seem to prefer recruiting children and
adolescents over young adults for military tasks (see Wessells, 2006 for a survey).
Several million children under the age of 18 are estimated to have served in combat
since 2001. In many of the armed groups in Liberia, Sierra Leone, Colombia and
Uganda, a large fraction of recruits were 14 years of age and younger (the definition of
a child for purposes of a war crime) (Beber and Blattman, 2013). Since children are
less able fighters than adults, such a recruitment strategy makes economic sense if child
recruits are more obedient and their personality is more malleable and adaptive
(Boyden, 2003; Peters et al., 2003; Beber and Blattman, 2013). Our finding that LRA
soldiering elevated trustworthiness particularly strongly among those who soldiered as
children (fourteen years and younger) but not among those who soldiered at a later
age is consistent with this explanation of rebels’ preference for recruiting children.
This study contributes to several debates on policy and development in post-conflict
societies. The findings suggest that gaps in economic outcomes between ex-soldiers
and their peers in Northern Uganda are not driven by lower trustworthiness or
discrimination on the part of receiving communities, and thus it may be more efficient
for interventions to focus on rebuilding human capital, especially schooling and
training that was lost or delayed due to time spent fighting. Next, several studies do
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find an increase in mental health problems such as anxiety and post-traumatic stress
syndrome in former LRA soldiers (Klasen et al., 2010). Future research should explore
the impacts of soldiering on other types of personality traits, besides trustworthiness,
that may affect labour market outcomes, including time preference, self-control and
resilience. Last, the evidence of limited awareness of the greater trustworthiness of
former soldiers among members of receiving communities provides an additional
rationale for designing reintegration programmes that provide training and services
jointly with non-soldiers, instead of providing services to former soldiers separately.23
Doing so may provide an additional benefit by facilitating the updating of beliefs and
increasing social capital in those communities.
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